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Abstract
This article investigates how municipal governments negotiate far-right contestations through the format of citizens’ dia-
logues and contemplates to what extent they disrupt established assumptions about participatory urban governance.
In doing so, I want to contribute to emerging scholarship on reactionary responses to migration-led societal transforma-
tions in cities via scrutinising their effects on institutional change in participatory practices. Building on participatory urban
governance literature and studies on the far right in the social sciences, I argue that inviting far-right articulations into the
democratic arena of participation serves to normalise authoritarian and racist positions, as the far right’s demand for
more direct involvement of ‘the people’ is expressed in reactionary terms. I will show how this applies to two prominent
notions of participation in the literature, namely, agonistic and communicative approaches. This argument is developed
through an explorative case study of two neighbourhood-based citizens’ dialogues in Cottbus, East Germany, which the
municipal government initiated in response to local far-right rallies.While a careful reading of these forums reveals produc-
tive potentials when the issue of international migration is untangled from context-specific, socio-spatial problems in the
neighbourhoods, my analysis also shows how the municipality’s negotiation of far-right contestations within the citizens’
dialogues serves to legitimise far-right ideology. I find that to negotiate today’s societal polarisation, municipal authorities
need to rethink local participatory institutions by disentangling these complex dynamics and reject far-right contestations,
while designing dialogues for democratic and emancipatory learning.
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1. Introduction
Discussions on how migration initiates institutional
change in cities often focus on the emancipatory poten-
tial of participatory practices such as urban citizen-
ship or how co-production strategies between civil soci-
ety organisations and public administrations can fos-
ter inclusive policies. Scholars, however, have neglected
changing forms of participation instigated by reac-
tionary responses to migration-led societal transforma-
tion. Addressing this gap, this article attends to far-right
contestations of such transformations in cities and asks
how they disrupt established assumptions about par-
ticipatory urban governance. The contemporary rise of
far-right politics poses new challenges to municipalities
across the globe, fuelling racism and xenophobic attacks
onmarginalised groups—calling into question an increas-
ingly plural and diverse urban order. Some scholars argue
Urban Planning, 2021, Volume 6, Issue 2, Pages 91–102 91
that the growing influence of far-right actors confronts
urban practitioners (policymakers, planners, advocates,
and organisers) with the practical question of how to
deal with a divided public (Rivero, Sotomayor, Zanotto,
& Zitcer, 2020). Others claim that “the ‘invisible’ contract
governing a multicultural…city is under threat” (Khakee,
2020, p. 179).
In Germany, manymunicipal governments have used
public citizens’ dialogues as an instrument to react to
far-right rallies, which have drastically increased since
the long summer of migration in 2015 (DIFU, 2019).
However, studies examining such practices dealing with
far-right contestations are scarce. How are far-right con-
testations negotiated through participatory processes?
To what extent do they disrupt established assumptions
about participation in the literature? Based on case study
research in the East German city of Cottbus, I hope to
answer these questions.
Promoting people’s participation in urban processes
has long been a key issue in discussions about urban gov-
ernance. This is aimed at recognising people’s voices in
city-making, which are viewed as a crucial element to
carry out urban development in amore effective, sustain-
able, and just way (Forester, 1989; Healey, 1992; Innes
& Booher, 2004). However, so-called communicative
approaches to participation have been widely problema-
tised, particularly regarding their inability to re-negotiate
power asymmetries in extremely unequal urban con-
texts (Cornwall, 2002; Fainstein, 1999; Flyvbjerg, 1996;
Huxley & Yiftachel, 2000; Miessen, 2011; Purcell, 2006;
Roy, 2009). One strand of critique derives from agonis-
tic approaches to participation, stipulating that inclu-
sive urban governance processes need to start not
from a position of trying to resolve conflict in order
to achieve consensus, but from a position of accep-
tance of uncertain situations and continual dissent and
opposition (Bäcklund & Mäntysalo, 2010; Beaumont &
Nicholls, 2008; Gualini, 2015; Pløger, 2004; Verloo, 2018).
Ultimately, they view conflict as a productive resource
in people’s involvement in city-making. In this article,
I want to build on these debates, exploring how both
approaches are put to the test in times of far-right con-
testations. To do so, I bring the literature on partici-
patory urban governance into conversation with stud-
ies on the far right in the social sciences, which reveal
the ambiguous participatory agenda of far-right politics
and point towards mechanisms of contestations that are
deeply reactionary.
Referring to these discussions, I examine the nego-
tiation of far-right contestations through state-led cit-
izens’ dialogues in Cottbus, which the municipal gov-
ernment launched in response to a series of far-right
rallies that took place in 2018. Analysing how these pub-
lic dialogues were designed at the nexus of communica-
tive/agonistic approaches to participation, I propose that
such participatory practices can reveal small windows of
democratic opportunity in a climate of rising reactionary
politics. This can happen if and when they help to dis-
sect racialised conflicts, disentangling the issue of inter-
national migration from context-specific neighbourhood
problems. However, in a second step I add complexity
to this argument, demonstrating how open-ended par-
ticipatory formats aimed at fostering dialogue between
long-term residents supportive of far-right politics and
municipal government representatives can serve to nor-
malise far-right agendas. Thus, I argue that such citizens’
dialogues escape communicative and agonistic assump-
tions about participatory processes alike, as they offer a
platform for reactionary articulations that ultimately dis-
rupt democratic dialogue.
The article is structured as follows: I start by explor-
ing the debate on participatory urban governance,
introducing critiques of communicative approaches and
highlighting agonistic perspectives as one prominent
alternative. I go on to define far-right contestations
by drawing on social science literature about the
far-right and identify the far-right’s ambiguous participa-
tory agenda. Suggesting that the contemporary rise in
far-right politics demands a newperspective on participa-
tory processes, I propose to bring these two literatures
into conversation. Third, I introduce the city of Cottbus
and reflect upon the methods used in my qualitative
fieldwork. Subsequently, I analyse two citizens’ dialogues
in their respective neighbourhoods—Sachsendorf and
Sandow—in detail. After presenting this case, I con-
clude by discussing the need to reconfigure participatory
processes that aim to negotiate far-right contestations
(regarding the design of both format and content) if they
are to remain within the remit of the democratic arena.
2. Conceptual Framework
2.1. Participatory Urban Governance: Tracing a
Manifold Debate
Urban studies scholars have long approached participa-
tory urban governance from distinct conceptual angles.
As it would go beyond the scope of this article to review
this rich debate in detail (for an overview see Frediani &
Cociña, 2019), I focus on two approaches that are rooted
in larger discussions in social theory between Jürgen
Habermas and Chantal Mouffe, namely, the notions of
‘communicative’ and ‘agonistic’ engagement. First, com-
municative approaches to participatory urban gover-
nance were put forward by authors such as Patsy Healey,
John Forester, and Judith Innes in the 1980s. The concep-
tual assumption of this ‘communicative turn’ in partic-
ipatory urban governance is that if rules are designed
to guarantee equality for deliberating parties, partici-
pants can likely find a rational consensus (Forester, 1989;
Healey, 1992; Innes & Booher, 2004). This perspective
was developed to address the undeniable limitations
of positivist, comprehensive-rationalist governance tools
in city-making. Instead, it gives “priority to the process
through which decisions are made and stresses the sig-
nificance of undistorted speech, [allowing] the relation
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of group identities and the explicit recognition of dif-
ference…to define a desirable set of social relations”
(Fainstein, 1999, pp. 259–260).
For the last decades, these strategies have figured
prominently among researchers and practitioners alike,
using such relational understandings of participatory pro-
cesses as a tool to address the complex socio-spatial
dynamics of city-making, and attempting to recognise
people’s voices within this process. However, criticism of
this ‘communicative turn’ has been widely advocated by
scholars from different disciplines, causing the publica-
tion of books with titles such as Participation: The New
Tyranny? (Cooke & Kothari, 2001) or The Nightmare of
Participation: Crossbench Praxis as a Mode of Criticality
(Miessen, 2011). These critiques draw attention to the
need to unpack the different conditions within which
participation is practiced, warning of the foregrounding
of local actions that leaves structural processes unchal-
lenged (e.g., Arnstein, 1969; Cornwall, 2002; Fainstein,
2010; Flyvbjerg, 1996; Purcell, 2006). More specifically,
the Habermas-inspired communicative approach is crit-
icised for “privileg[ing] communication at the expense
of its wider social and economic contexts” (Huxley &
Yiftachel, 2000, p. 333). In this vein, masking deliberation
as neutral strategy provides “an extremely attractive way
for neoliberals to maintain hegemony while ensuring
political stability” (Purcell, 2009, p. 140). Consequently,
critiques have highlighted that the emphasis of commu-
nicative approaches on consensus building hides social
complexities, diversities (Miraftab, 2019)—and conflict.
Agonist approaches to participation have directly
emerged from this last criticism, acknowledging conflict
“as a constitutive element of social relations [in the city]
and as a source of their strength and ability to innovate”
(Gualini, 2015, p. 3). Inspired by Chantal Mouffe’s theory
of ‘agonistic pluralism’ (Mouffe, 2000), this perspective
politicises ideas of plurality and inclusion in participatory
processes (Swyngedouw, 2011; Wilson & Swyngedouw,
2015). Conflict is viewed as a productive force, poten-
tially transforming antagonism (conflict between ene-
mies) into agonism: “A relationship between adversaries,
not enemies” (Mouffe, 2000, p. 102). Hence, city-making
“should ideally be a place for strife about legitimate
options and meanings on the road towards reasonable
and commonly agreed solutions or among mutual adver-
saries” (Pløger, 2004, p. 72), whereby collective pas-
sion (rather than rationalist deliberation) is viewed as
a channel through which citizens articulate themselves
(Amin, 2002; Beaumont & Nicholls, 2008; Mouffe, 2000;
Verloo, 2018).
Thus, agonistic notions understand conflict as radi-
cally different to the communicative ideal, namely “as
one that is neither physical nor violent, but a friction
that emerges on a content and productive level, a con-
flict played out within the remit of the democratic
arena” (Miessen, 2011, p. 101). However, Bäcklund and
Mäntysalo (2010) have argued that even though the
paradigmatic shift from communicative to agonistic par-
ticipation has sparked fruitful theoretical debates at the
nexus of planning and democratic theory, little schol-
arly attention has been paid to the empirical facets of
this shift. They lament that this contributes to widen-
ing the gap between theory and practice. Based on
their own empirical research, they point to the ten-
sions between agonistic theory as municipal Leitbild and
urban practice. Specifically, they find that both theo-
ries often co-exist in the participatory practices offered
by city administrations, generating ‘institutional ambi-
guity’ (Bäcklund & Mäntysalo, 2010, p. 348), whereby
new conceptual ideas about participatory urban gover-
nance are merely imposed on top of existing adminis-
trative and institutional structures, leading to ‘shallow
practical reform’ (Bäcklund & Mäntysalo, 2010). In a
similar vein, others have argued for the need to move
beyond the communicative and agonistic divide in partic-
ipatory practices and, indeed, combine both conceptual
perspectives in urban analysis that is more connected
to empirical research (Beaumont & Loopmans, 2008;
Bond, 2011; Legacy, Metzger, Steele, & Gualini, 2019;
Van Wymeersch, Oosterlynck, & Vanoutrive, 2019).
Against this backdrop, I want to contemplate to what
extent these established assumptions about participatory
processes are disrupted when conflicts escape the demo-
cratic arena and can no longer be viewed as moments
of communicative or agonistic negotiation in the city.
What happens if urban actors bring far-right articulations
to the negotiation table? And how can we rethink modes
of participation in cities facing this challenge?
2.2. The Ambiguous Participatory Agenda of the Far
Right and Its Mechanisms of Contestations
To understand the challenges the rise of reactionary pol-
itics poses to participatory urban governance processes,
I draw on insights from social science literature about
the far right, shedding light on the far right’s ambigu-
ous stance towards public participation and its modes
of contestation. In doing so, I want to contribute to the
debate on participatory urban governance by stipulat-
ing that the rise of far-right politics demands a new per-
spective on participatory practices. Let me first clarify
some terms, however: I purposefully refer to the ‘far
right,’ not ‘right-wing populism’ to capture the contem-
porary surge of reactionary politics. In doing so, I follow
political scientists who have argued that to label con-
temporary reactionary currents as ‘populist’ is to fun-
damentally downplay their threat to democratic institu-
tions (for detailed terminological debates seeMondon &
Winter, 2020; Mudde, 2007). The far right is used as an
umbrella term to recognise common traits between reac-
tionary political actors, including the extreme right, the
(populist) radical right, and (neo)-fascists (Mudde, 2019),
suggesting that what they hold in common are anti-
pluralistic, racist, anti-feminist, nationalist, and authori-
tarian attitudes and ideologies. This core element of the
far right entails the belief that “the nation state should
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be inhabited only by native people; and that societies
must be strictly ordered and infringement severely sanc-
tioned” (Mudde, 2007, pp. 18–23) However, in the vast
literature on this contested subject, a dominant position
distinguishing the ‘extreme’ from the ‘radical’ variants of
far-right politics with regards to the different democratic
elements that constitutes them.While the extreme right
is essentially hostile towards constitutional democratic
principles, the radical right holds oppositional attitudes
towards liberal democracies (Mudde, 2019, p. 8).
Concerning the far right’s perspective on participa-
tory practices, acknowledging these two different polit-
ical strands within it is crucial. First, the extreme right
essentially rejects the foundations of democracy, i.e.,
popular sovereignty and majority rule. Second, the rad-
ical right accepts the essence of democracy in the
name of ‘the people,’ albeit while opposing key ele-
ments of liberal democracies, i.e., minority rights, rule
of law, and the separation of powers (Barney & Laycock,
1999). Further, radical-right leaders promote a ‘plebisc-
itarian linkage’ between the executive and ‘the peo-
ple,’ which refers to the idea that they tend to act as
the embodiment or more efficient executor of the gen-
eral will of ‘the people’ once in government (Canovan,
2002, p. 34).This points towards the tension between
the radical right’s rhetoric of more direct participation
and the actual democratic aspirations embodied therein
(Canovan, 1999, p. 14; Paxton, 2019), essentially fail-
ing to grant citizens control over decision-making pro-
cesses (Barney & Laycock, 1999). In practice, these
opposing strands often overlap, rendering the partic-
ipatory agenda of far-right actors profoundly ambigu-
ous (Canovan, 2002, p. 34). The entangled heterogene-
ity of far-right participatory articulations also alludes
to the far right’s multifarious organisational structures,
with a majority of contemporary far-right actors often
simultaneously engaging in the electoral and the protest
arenas (Castelli Gattinara & Pirro, 2019; Rucht, 2018).
Thus, there are emerging publications that address the
interconnection between the success of far-right parties
and right-wing street movements (Froio, Gattinara, Bulli,
& Albanese, 2020), which also applies in the case of
Cottbus, as I will illustrate subsequently.
To operationalise my analysis of the negotiation of
far-right contestations by municipal governments, I bor-
row from German sociologist Heitmeyer to define three
mechanisms of contestation. According to him, the core
aim of contemporary far-right politics is to contest and
destabilise the institutions that uphold the tenets of
open societies in liberal democracies. Its ultimate goal
is to install a new, authoritarian order (Heitmeyer, 2018,
p. 239) by way of, first, promoting a ‘dichotomous
world view’ in an increasingly complex world, present-
ing a supposedly tempting alternative of clarity and
control. This often takes the form of imagining ‘the
people’ as a homogenous entity whose identity, ideas,
and will can be fully represented, versus the ‘elite.’
Another divisive dichotomy concerns the racist distinc-
tion between ‘the people’ and the ‘alien other’ (in con-
temporary Western societies most notably immigrants,
Muslims, or refugees—not the ‘native elite’). Second, far-
right politics advance the ‘emotionalization’ of societal
problems and politics. This ‘emotionalised politicisation’
(Heitmeyer, 2018, p. 252) is an effective strategy to insti-
gate a sense of loss among supporters of the far right, e.g.
linking structural problems like rising social inequalities
to feelings of fear. Finally, far-right politics use ‘control’
as a means of power to install a supposedly new sense
of order, by way of returning to an imagined ‘old’ order.
As such, far-right solutions are promoted as attempts to
‘gain back control’ for individuals and a subset of society
alike. In the next section, I examine how these mecha-
nisms of far-right contestations are negotiated through
participatory processes in the case of Cottbus.
3. Situating Cottbus
An hour and a half by train from Berlin, themid-sized city
of Cottbus is located in the federal state of Brandenburg,
close to the Polish border (see Figure 1). Like many cities
in East Germany, it experienced urban shrinkage since
the 1990s, facing economic and demographic decline
(Bernt, 2009) after German reunification in 1990 came
with a neoliberal ‘shock therapy’ (Grubbauer & Kusiak,
2012, p. 13), precipitating the drastic reorganisation of
the region’s economic system. In 1990, Cottbus still had
Figure 1. The location of the case study, Cottbus (in
Brandenburg, Germany). The map is oriented North.
Source: German Federal Agency for Cartography and
Geodesy (2021).
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a population of approximately 134,000 (Stadt Cottbus,
2019b). Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, this
number dropped drastically, reaching a historic low of
99,500 in 2012 (Stadt Cottbus, 2019c). Throughout the
former German Democratic Republic up until now, the
coal-mining industry was the most important economic
sector in the region (IASS, 2018). However, the city’s
unemployment rate has long been one of the highest
in Germany, today it is at 7.4%, as compared to the
national average of 5.6% (Stadt Cottbus, 2019a). Against
this backdrop, the city is slowly growing again due to
the arrival of international migrants that began in 2015.
In 2019, approximately 8% of Cottbus’ population were
foreigners compared to 3.4% in 2011 (Stadt Cottbus,
2019b). Accordingly, in 2016 the city had just over
100,000 inhabitants. The influx of international migrants
has mainly consisted of Syrian refugees, whose abso-
lute number comprised 2,472 in 2018 (Stadt Cottbus,
2019b). These refugees largely moved to the city’s
peripheral prefabricated housing estates that had been
built under socialism, which are also characteristic for
Sachsendorf and Sandow, the two neighbourhoods that
form the subject ofmy study. Both neighbourhoodswere
particularly hit by the city’s demographic decline and
part of the national redevelopment plan Stadtumbau
Ost (Urban Restructuring East) focused on demolition
(Liebmann, Hagemeister, Haller, & Nelle, 2010). In a nut-
shell, Sachsendorf and Sandow consequently underwent
symbolic marginalisation and became increasingly home
to elderly lower social classes (Kabisch & Peter, 2014).
3.1. A note on Research Methods
My subsequent discussion of two citizens’ dialogues in
these neighbourhoods is based on a qualitative and
explorative single-case study of the city of Cottbus (Yin,
2014). The empirical data used for this article comprises
participant observation, 16 semi-structured interviews
and document analysis. First, I participated in several
neighbourhood-based citizens’ dialogues that took place
across the city during 2018 and 2019. In addition to
these in-person observations, I watched and transcribed
the video recordings of the events in Sachsendorf and
Sandow, which were made available on the city’s web-
site. This facilitated my data analysis, as it allowed to
systematically code the different contributions made
by residents. I chose to examine the neighbourhoods
of Sachsendorf and Sandow in detail for two reasons:
On one hand, both are attractive neighbourhoods for
refugees due to low rents and have experienced rapid
diversification over the last years (for a thorough analy-
sis for the transformation of peripheral neighbourhoods
in East Germany due to the arrival of refugees, see
El-Kayed, Bernt, Hamann, & Pilz, 2020). On the other
hand, it is those neighbourhoods where voter turnout
for the far-right party Alternative for Germany (AfD) has
been the city’s highest, encompassing 23,6% and 26,5%
respectively in 2019’s municipal elections (Stadt Cottbus,
2019d; for more insights on the socio-spatial conditions
of the AfD’s electoral success see Förtner, Belina, &
Naumann, 2020).
Second, I returned to Cottbus in the summer months
of 2020 to conduct interviews with government officials,
politicians involved in the organisation of the partici-
patory formats, local social workers and residents that
had participated in the dialogues. I conducted these
interviews during the global Covid-19 pandemic, which
posed specific challenges, as we have explored else-
where (Nettelbladt & Reichle, in press). Third, I com-
plemented these investigations with the analysis of tex-
tual resources, such as development plans from the city
administration. Additionally, I scrutinised thewebsites of
local far-right actors to obtain an understanding of the
envisioned strategies andmotives they had to attend the
citizens’ dialogues. Lastly, newspaper articles covering
the citizens’ dialogues provided another view of the way
the participatory strategies were perceived in Cottbus
and beyond.
3.2. Cottbus as a Bastion of Far-Right Organisation
Scholars of far-right politics and activist working on
the prevention of far-right politics have characterised
Cottbus as a place par excellence for the mobilisation of
the far-right in Germany. Since the 1990s, Cottbus has
served as a far-right hub, connecting ‘concerned citizens’
with far-right intellectuals who have managed to acti-
vate long-established neo-Nazi networks in the region.
A particularly active actor has been the local extreme-
right movement Zukunft Heimat, which holds close ties
with völkisch authoritarian groups, as well as the local
branch of the AfD, which had gained 27% in the munici-
pal elections in 2019 (Fröschner &Warnecke, 2019, p. 7).
This melange of far-right actors points to the porous
borders between parties and movements (Froio et al.,
2020). For example, since October 2020, the founder
of Zukunft Heimat serves as chairman of the AfD in
Brandenburg’s state parliament. This far-right presence
in the city has harmful consequences for the far-right’s
targets: 2016 alone saw 41 officially registered far-right
violent attacks in Cottbus, the largest number in the state
of Brandenburg (Opferperspektive, 2021). Further, the
municipal government in Cottbus has consistently down-
played this threat and was referring to the city’s vio-
lent far-right youth groups a ‘passing fad’ in the 1990s
(Emcke, 1999).
Between 2017 and 2018, Cottbus witnessed fort-
nightly rallies organised by Zukunft Heimat, gathering
between 2,000–3,000 people protesting against the
right to asylum, the influx of international migrants,
the ‘political elite,’ ‘fake news,’ and ‘gender ideology.’
Speeches given at these rallies proclaimed racist and
anti-Semitic positions, as well as conspiracy theories
(Botsch & Schulze, 2018), and the atmosphere was domi-
nated by the hostile and aggressive mood of participants
carrying signs demanding the abolition of the Federal
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Republic (Botsch & Schulze, 2018). During the following
months,migration became a particularly politicised topic
in Cottbus, with international media outlets reporting on
far-right violent attacks on refugees (Brady, 2018; Buck,
2018), while local far-right actors successfully shaped
this media discourse to connect migration to questions
of security. Long-term residents complained about the
municipal government’s failure to ‘protect’ them from
the alleged effects of migration, which briefly pressured
the mayor into declaring an ‘immigration ban’ that was,
however, not actualised (Rafael, 2018).
It is in this context, that the mayor (Christian
Democratic Union of Germany) announced the citizens’
dialogues as a direct response by the municipal gov-
ernment to the far-right rallies in a meeting of the city
council in April 2018 (Stadt Cottbus, 2018). During this
meeting, the reason for the envisaged dialogues was
clearly articulated by party members from the Greens,
die Linke, and the Social Democratic Party of Germany
as being the far-right rallies, as the following state-
ment by a member of the Greens illustrates: “We wel-
come the mayor’s effort of launching a dialogue among
all Cottbussers…where we should urgently address the
far-right tendencies in our city” (Stadt Cottbus, 2018).
Meanwhile, members of National Democratic Party of
Deutschland and AfD took the position of far-right
protestors. Interestingly though, when the dialogues
started in May 2018, the initiators did not directly
address the original cause. Rather, the intention for the
participatory forums was framed as an opportunity to
“simply get into an exchange with each other about the
problems in our city, no matter if we [residents and
municipal government] agree or not,” as the mayor pro-
claimed during the first forum.
3.3. The Citizens’ Dialogues: Aim, Design, Participants
Thus, the official reason for organising the dialogues
was to ameliorate the perceived uneasy relationship
between residents and the municipal government,
based on an “observed lack of trust in state institu-
tions” (Chairman of the City Council, Citizens’ Dialogue
Sachsendorf) among residents. Accordingly, the goal of
this participatory process was not to arrive at a con-
crete planning outcome like, for instance, a develop-
ment plan. Rather, participation in the citizens’ dialogues
was viewed as an end in itself. In this sense, the cit-
izens’ dialogues were designed with both communica-
tive and agonistic elements in mind: First, regarding the
consensus/conflict nexus, as I will illustrate, the organ-
isers repeatedly stressed that the participatory forums
should be a space for “disagreeing views” (thus, siding
with agonism’s emphasis on conflict), while also high-
lighting the need for “the common ground of informed
arguments” (Interview, civil servant, August 17, 2020),
alluding to the communicative emphasis on delibera-
tive consensus. Second, regarding the nexus of rational-
ity/emotions, they claimed that “we should keep with
the facts, but not abandon emotions” (Stadt Cottbus,
2018); thus, simultaneously calling on rational and pas-
sionate debate.
Asked why this aim could not be achieved through
existing participatory structures, one civil servant
claimed:
We basically felt that the existing participatory institu-
tions [e.g., townhall meetings or consultation hours
for residents] did not suffice to deal with the situa-
tion.Wewanted to talk differently with residents who
did not feel like they were being heard. (Interview,
August 26, 2020)
This quotation illustrates the logic underpinning the
municipality’s strategy: By means of designing a forum
where “everyone has to tolerate each other’s opin-
ion” (Moderator, Interview, August 27, 2020) officials
hoped to reduce people’s dissatisfaction. This entailed
the assumption that, “if protestors’ concerns are taken
seriously by the municipal government, far-right mobili-
sations by local extreme-right groups become less attrac-
tive” (Moderator, Interview, August 27, 2020).
The municipality’s decision to locate the citizens’ dia-
logues at the neighbourhood level was explained by one
of the moderators in Sachsendorf: “It is the neighbour-
hoods where the problems, questions, worries, needs,
and challenges are that are at the centre of our discus-
sion” (Citizens’ Dialogue Sachsendorf).
Each event followed the same top-down set-up: The
mayor and chairman of the city council were seated
on a stage and residents were invited to sit in front of
them. Leading personnel of the local administration par-
ticipated, including staff from the Ordnungsamt (munici-
pal office of public order), the department of urban plan-
ning, and the department of social affairs. Additionally,
the staff of the local immigration office, the police, and
the municipal housing company were present. All events
were moderated by two professional mediators, who
were mostly in charge of facilitating the speaking order,
which was structured in a hierarchical question-answer
format that lasted two hours. At the beginning, the mod-
erators laid out formal rules of discussion, telling peo-
ple to raise their hands to contribute and to not inter-
rupt others. Afterwards, residents were allowed to stay
and have one-to-one conversationswithmunicipal repre-
sentatives. In both neighbourhoods, the dialogues took
place in local schools and approximately 140 residents
showed up.
However, it is striking that residential groups with an
international background hardly participated. In Sandow,
a total of 33 residents spoke up, all of them long-
term residents of the city. In Sachsendorf, 3 out of 24
residents that spoke publicly presented themselves as
refugees. Furthermore, it is not clear howmany far-right
activists participated, as the events were open to all
residents in the respective neighbourhoods. Based on
my participant observations and document analysis, it
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appears that there was no pre-organised effort to agi-
tate the events, however, the majority of long-term resi-
dents promoted far-right ideology, perhapsmirroring the
high electoral success of the AfD (see Section 3.2). It is
important to point out, though, that there were other
long-term residents that showed solidarity with residen-
tial newcomers.
4. Productive Conflict or Normalisation of Far-Right
Ideology?
The motives and logic underpinning the design of citi-
zens’ dialogues in Cottbus explored above indicate an
attempt by officials to create a space of agonistic dis-
agreement, while maintaining a deliberative order. Even
though they were designed in a top-down manner, the
forums were agonistically framed as an open-ended pro-
cess, whereby the coming together of residents and the
municipal government constituted the primary goal.
4.1. Moments of Agonistic Conflict
Indeed, at times, this design allowed for the emergence
of the transformative potential of conflict. This hap-
pened when racialised neighbourhood conflicts were
untangled, separating the issue of international migra-
tion from socio-economic urban problems. For exam-
ple, a prominent topic was the issue of housing. Most
refugees in Sachsendorf and Sandow now live in apart-
ments owned by the city’s housing company. In this
context, long-term residents were concerned “if there
will still be affordable housing in the future” (Citizens’
Dialogue, Sandow), implying that it was ‘the refugees’
taking away affordable housing. As representatives of
the housing company were present, these worries could
quickly be removed, as they could point to the statistics
on vacant flats. Another examplewas the issue of litter in
public spaces. Several residents blamed refugees for ‘not
cleaning up after themselves,’ promoting a racist logic
of ‘dirty foreigners,’ as this comment by a long-term res-
ident illustrates: “I live directly next to them refugees].
And I don’t even want to start talking about the litter. It’s
everywhere! It’s everywhere! Is nobody teaching them
how to clean up after themselves?” (Citizens’ Dialogue,
Sachsendorf).
However, another long-term resident countered this
racist framing, directly challenging the claim by point-
ing to the “typical German litter” in the neighbourhood,
stating that trash “is not an attribute of the refugees”
(Citizens’ Dialogue, Sachsendorf). Thus, I argue that the
dialogues became productive whenever participants or
municipal actors managed to stir the debate away from
a narrow focus on alleged migration-induced problems.
This certainly underlines the usefulness of negotiations
at the neighbourhood scale, allowing for the discus-
sion of concrete socio-spatial problems when dealing
with broader societal polarisation trends. In the case
of Cottbus, this discussion can be read in the context
of the neighbourhoods’ histories of reconstruction. Yet,
during the dialogues topics such as housing or public
space remained underrepresented. Instead, what dom-
inated the debates was the instrumentalization of migra-
tion (Radvan & Raab, 2020, p. 14), meaning that alleged
migration-induced problems served as a vehicle for the
articulation of far-right attitudes and ideology by some
of the participants. This was not rejected by institutional
actors, as I will explore in the remainder of this article.
4.2. ‘Tolerating’ the Far-Right as a ‘Democratic Gesture’
The municipal government’s idea to ‘take people’s wor-
ries seriously’ often legitimised far-right agendas. I illus-
trate this process, shedding light onto the three mecha-
nisms of far-right contestations explored previously, i.e.,
a dichotomous world views, the emotionalization of soci-
etal problems, and a control paradigm.
First, in both neighbourhoods, a recurring theme
was the differentiation between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ I inter-
pret this as purposeful ‘othering’ of migrants (Hall, 2006,
p. 47) or the ‘political elite’ (Heitmeyer, 2018) to defend
the privileges of the established majority group. For
example, refugees are continuously referred to nega-
tively by long-term residents and institutional actors
alike. This took various forms, with civil servants por-
traying refugees as a financial burden to the city and
long-term residents propagating stereotypes such as
unlawful behaviour or their ‘backward’ Muslim culture.
In Sachsendorf, this is illustrated by an openly racist
statement: “The Islamic State has gotten its claws into
Cottbus. Muslim youth gangs have staged an uprising
and have tried to divide Cottbus among themselves”
(Citizens’ Dialogue, Sachsendorf).
This contribution shows the construction and deval-
uation of a homogenous, essentially ‘alien’ group that is
rejected based on ascribed negative characteristics held
to be incompatibly with the majority ‘we’ (Radvan &
Raab, 2020, p. 25). This occurs through the homogeni-
sation and imagination of a group of young people
as Muslim ‘gang’ accused of Islamist violence, echo-
ing the growing prominence of Islamophobia in Europe
(Wolfreys, 2018). Additionally, many participants blame
the federal government for the city’s alleged problem
with migration. In both instances, city officials actively
support this narrative: For example, a civil servant
from the department of social affairs insinuated the
“duty of immigrants to integrate” (Citizens’ Dialogue,
Sandow) and the mayor proclaimed multiple times
that “frankly, the federal government let us down [in
the management of international migration]” (Citizens’
Dialogue, Sandow).
This speaks to a second aspect of contestation,
namely the emotionalization of migration. Participants
in the dialogues stated that they felt threatened by
the increasing presence of migrant families, despite
there being no evidence for heightened crime rates
in Cottbus in correlation with the arrival of refugees.
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However, instead of correcting this line of argument, the
organisers encouraged it by underlining that the emo-
tional and subjective perception of residents should be
heard. Prompted in an interview about the dangers of
euphemising the impact of such racist claims, onemoder-
ator replied: “We think facts are our life, but what counts
is the subjective and objective sense of security. They
only go together; this is what we wanted to recognise at
the dialogues” (Interview, July 27, 2020).
Yet, the initiators’ desire to create a space where par-
ticipants can articulate their emotions did not extend to
the targets of racist comments. Representatives of the
city council actively negated experiences of racism when
voiced by refugees themselves (even though these con-
tributions remain rare, see Section 3.2. for an indication
of the lack of diversity of participants), as the following
exchange illustrates: “Hello, I come fromSyria….I’ve been
in Germany for two years and I live in Cottbus….Why do
people hate refugees?” (Citizens’ Dialogue, Sachsendorf).
A representative of the city council answered:
Nobody hates you…we live in a country with human-
istic values. This is what I can say in the name of all
Germans. Germans are people that are always ready
to help and protect….All in all, there is hospitality
towards those who really need protection and really
try to integrate. (Citizens’ Dialogue, Sachsendorf)
Thus, the open question about hate against refugees
is denied by a local politician, pointing instead
towards abstract claims such as ‘humanism’ of ‘all
Germans.’ Given the history of far-right violence in
Cottbus, this deeply ignorant denial of racist attitudes
against refugees fuels and normalises the agenda of
far-right actors.
Finally, the municipal government’s negotiation of
far-right contestations during the dialogues can be illu-
minated through the way it furthered the far-right’s con-
trol paradigm. This became apparent when migration
was linked to questions of security and order in pub-
lic spaces: Long-term residents repeatedly lamented the
noise of refugee children (Citizens’ Dialogue, Sandow)
or expressed fear of leaving the house at night due
to the presence of newcomers (Citizens’ Dialogue,
Sachsendorf). The following contribution by a long-term
resident exemplifies these concerns, also juxtaposing
today’s perceived insecurity with an imagined, more
orderly past before the arrival of refugees:
When I moved here about 15 years ago, it was
possible to leave the pub drunk and walk home at
night. Now I wonder what to do in the evening.
That is actually a reason to despair, I have to
say….What’s next?….Should we all carry weapons?
(Citizens’ Dialogue, Sachsendorf)
Examining how the city administration responded to
such claims, it is striking that officials underline their
responsibility to ensure security, as the following com-
ment by a civil servant of the Ordnungsamt illuminates:
“A clear message: In cooperation with the police, we
have the matter under control and are showing strength.
Every day” (Citizens’ Dialogue, Sachsendorf). Evidently,
the intention of such responses is to appease people’s
fears. However, given the context of such statements, it
is highly questionable if evoking a law-and-order rhetoric
is an effective strategy to reduce such fears. Moreover,
referencing the importance of a strong police presence
can be read as implicit confirmation of the residents’
statement, furthering the idea of refugees as a threat to
the neighbourhood.
4.3. The Limits of Participatory Urban Governance in
Negotiating Far-Right Contestations
Overall, my analysis shows that the municipality’s nego-
tiation of far-right contestations throughout the citi-
zens’ dialogues in Cottbus escapes agonistic and commu-
nicative approaches to participatory urban governance
alike. While the organisers initially used an agonistic
understanding of participation to frame the dialogues’
open-ended gesture, they also highlighted the need
for rational debate. However, throughout the course of
the citizens’ dialogues in Sachsendorf and Sandow it
became clear that the execution of this envisioned for-
mat allowed for the disruption of democratic dialogue,
as representatives of the city administration and the city
council, as well as the moderators, treated far-right con-
testations as a legitimate aspect of conflict. Crucially, the
design of the dialogues as conflictive spaces of ‘tolerated
disagreement’ served to normalise far-right attitudes.
This normalisation occurred through four dimen-
sions, two of which relate to questions of format, while
the two others concernmatters of content: 1) Apart from
designating formal rules regarding the speaking order,
organisers did not deem it necessary to lay out demo-
cratic principles such as minority rights to guide the par-
ticipatory format. 2) This was aggravated by the fact that
organisers failed to consider the composition of partic-
ipants when designing the formats; refugee networks
in the neighbourhoods were not specifically invited and
information about the citizens’ dialogues only adver-
tised in the local newspaper and on the city’s website,
in German. 3) At the content level, organisers did not
reject racist comments by participants, and at times even
encouraged them. This was legitimised as they repeat-
edly highlighted the need for long-term residents to artic-
ulate their subjective feelings. In doing so, organisers
dangerously conflated genuine empathy with the emo-
tionalization of migration. If the municipal government’s
aimwas to engage residents in democratic discourse, the
idea of listening to the dissatisfied without clearly object-
ing to racism appears counterproductive. 4) Finally, the
legitimisation of far-right articulations became evident
as the organisers’ replies to comments by long-term res-
idents reinforced a dichotomous world view (both with
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regards to the ‘native we’ vs. ‘immigrant other’ and in
relation to the accusation of the ‘elites in Berlin,’ i.e., the
mayor blaming the Federal Republic for the city’s alleged
problems with international migration) and with regards
to the far-right’s control paradigm. The latter became
clear when residents voiced security concerns linked to
the arrival of refugees in both neighbourhoods, which
city officials reinforced.
5. Concluding Thoughts
To summarise, the aim of this article was to examine how
far-right contestations of migration-led societal transfor-
mations in cities put established assumptions about par-
ticipatory processes to the test. Specifically, I focused
on the nexus of communicative/agonistic approaches
to participation as prominent positions currently dis-
cussed in the literature on participatory urban gover-
nance. Bringing them into conversation with social sci-
ence literature about the far right, I showed that con-
temporary far-right contestations evoke a different set of
questions to those usually posed in research on participa-
tory urban governance processes. Those insights illumi-
nated the ideological and organisational heterogeneity
of far-right actors, ranging from extreme-right to radical-
right positions, and stressed that the far right’s partici-
patory agenda in the name of a homogenous imagina-
tion of ‘the people’ is deeply reactionary and incompat-
ible with democratic negotiation. Consequently, scruti-
nising the case of Cottbus, I argued that the agonistic
idea of taming antagonism into agonism in the context
of surging far-right contestations is deeply problematic.
Framing racist and authoritarian articulations as a legiti-
mate side of the conflict is to vindicate them. Equally so,
the communicative ideal of rational debate is profoundly
disputable, as it treats far-right articulations as a legiti-
mate side of an argument.
In Cottbus, the municipal government launched cit-
izens’ dialogues that combined both these approaches
to participatory urban governance in responding to local
far-right rallies. Crucially, this new formatwas introduced
at the neighbourhood scale, as existing participatory
institutions such as the city council were thought to
pose too high a threshold for residents to participate in.
Indeed,my analysis shows that the neighbourhood-scale
proved to be a fruitful site of negotiation as it helped
disentangle the issue of international migration from
context-specific socio-spatial problems. In Sachsendorf
and Sandow, these problemswere implicitly linked to the
neighbourhoods histories of reconstruction and demoli-
tion. However, the dialogues also served as a platform for
far-right positions, as the municipal government and city
administration did not reject reactionary claims. In this
context, the ideas of agonistic strife and rational consen-
sus building normalised key tenets of far-right politics
and disrupted the possibility of democratic dialogue. The
municipal government appeared utterly complicit in this
process of disruption, as it furthered: 1) a dichotomous
worldview in the form of racist language and ‘anti-elite’
sentiments, 2) the emotionalization of societal problems
by framing migration as a security threat, and 3) the
installation of a ‘control paradigm’ that calls for author-
itarian politics. Contemplating the metaphor of disrup-
tion, it appears that while the power relations inher-
ent to the participatory formats in Cottbus rupture the
democratic ideals of theories of participatory urban gov-
ernance, they also present a certain continuity with cri-
tiques of participatory processes.
Thus, to conclude, I contend that municipal lead-
ers need to reconfigure the practice of participation to
negotiate contemporary far-right contestations regard-
ing both format and content of such participatory
endeavours. In a climate of rising reactionary forces,
locating societal negotiations at the neighbourhood level
proves productive, as such interventions hold the poten-
tial to address the roots of political grievance and dis-
empowerment by recognising past injustices (Bollens,
2012, p. 235). However,municipalities are urged to reject
far-right articulations by conveying the importance of
democratic principles themselves. In terms of format,
municipalities need to actively seek to include a diversity
of participants so that citizens’ dialogues represent the
views and concerns of all residents in the neighbourhood.
This could either be achieved through a closer exchange
between themunicipal government and neighbourhood-
based community organising when preparing the events
or through democratic experiments such as civic lotteries
that would ensure the random sampling of participants.
Nevertheless, as I illustrated by analysing the shift
that was made in the council meeting, from the munic-
ipality’s focus on the far right to concentrating on the
issue of trust between long-term residents and the city
government, it is striking how there was almost no effort
to address those most vulnerable to, and/or suffering
from, far-right attacks in the city. This could be achieved,
for instance, by considering local meetings where munic-
ipal actors specifically listen to the targets of far-right
attacks, attempting to mobilise a different emotional
register, one that recognises the harmful consequences
of far-right contestations. Regarding content, municipal
governments need to design guiding parameters of dia-
logue that address the limits of democratic content, i.e.,
that protect against all kinds of discrimination as a pre-
condition of participation. This also entails designing par-
ticipatory settings in such a way that participants are
comfortable and recognise it as a(n) (un-)learning pro-
cess and are open to the revision of previously held stand-
points. Finally, negotiating far-right contestations takes
the courage to endure antagonism in case participants
refuse to give up far-right positions. Otherwise, ‘hostile
democracy’ (Süß & Kolioulis, 2020) prevails.
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